The winter of 2013 seems to be “zero-day” season. Right after my colleague Haifei Li analyzed the powerful Flash zero day last week, Adobe sent a security alert for another zero-day attack targeting the latest (and earlier) versions of Adobe Reader. Unlike Internet Explorer zero-day exploits that we have seen in the past, this Reader zero-day exploit is a fully “weaponized” affair. It contains advanced techniques such as bypassing address-space layout randomization/data-execution prevention by using memory disclosure and a sandbox escape in the broker process. In this blog we will give a brief analysis of the exploitation.
The malicious PDF file used in the this exploitation consists mainly of three parts:
- A flat-encoded XFA object
- An encrypted binary stream, which we believe is related to the two dropped DLLs
The exploitation has two stages. The first-stage code execution inside the sandboxed process happens in the AcroForm.api module. A vtable pointer will be read from the attacker-controlled heap-spray area and later will be used in the call instruction.
Most important, there is no traditional shellcode at all! All the required shellcode functions are implemented in the ROP code level. That means most emulation-based shellcode-detection techniques will fail in detecting such an exploitation, because those techniques see only a bunch of addresses within a legitimate module. It’s similar to the old iOS jailbreak exploit that can be used to defeat the iOS code-signing enhancement.
The ROP shellcode first decrypts an embedded DLL (D.T) in memory and drops it to the AppData\Local\Temp\acrord32_sbx folder. Then, it loads the DLL into the current process. After that, the hijacked thread suspends itself by calling Kernel32!Sleep API. When D.T runs in the sandboxed process, it drops other DLLs (L2P.T, etc.) and is ready to escape the sandbox by exploiting another Adobe vulnerability.
The second-stage code execution occurs inside the broker process. The destination of the call instruction can also be controlled by the attacker.
The second-stage ROP shellcode is very short. It simply loads the dropped DLL L2P.T and goes into a sleep state. At this point, the exploit has already successfully broken out of the Reader sandbox because the attacker-controlled code (L2P.T) managed to run in the high-privileged broker process.
For McAfee customers, we have released signature 0x402e0600 “UDS-HTTP: Adobe Reader and Acrobat XFA Component Remote Code Execution” for the Network Security Platform appliances. Also, the generic buffer overflow prevention (Sigs 6013 and 6048) feature on our HIPS product will help to stop related attacks.
Thanks to Bing Sun, Chong Xu, and Haifei Li for their help with this analysis.
Leave a reply